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ORGANIZATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICTING PROFESSIONAL
IDENTITIES
Cassandra Burke Robertson*
In recent years, professionals in the military have suffered criticism
for their failure to counter military excess—especially in the area of torture
and maltreatment of detainees. Much of the criticism leveled against such
professionals has assumed that they were bad actors who were making a
conscious choice to avoid the strictures of their code of ethics. This Article
counters that narrative by applying identity theory to offer a more situationist explanation. It argues that some of these professional failures arise from
the cognitive incentives faced by individuals in an organization that rewards organizational deference over independent professional advice. Medical, legal, and other professionals in large organizations must deal with
two competing identities—one tied to their membership in a profession, and
one tied to their role in supporting the organizational mission. Identity
theory predicts that when both identities are activated, individuals are more
likely to act in accordance with the more salient identity. The Article recommends that military leaders and other organizational managers create
formal mechanisms to recognize and reward professional competence even
when professional responsibilities diverge from organizational expediency.
Such policies may heighten the salience of the professional identity, thereby
reducing the risk that individuals will subordinate their professional responsibilities in favor of deference to organizational aims.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the United States has called on the professional expertise of psychologists, doctors, lawyers, and other professionals to assist
in military operations. In a number of cases, however, a troubling paradox
emerged: just when the nation most needed to draw on these professionals‘
specialized expertise to limit or counterbalance military excess, a significant
number of these professionals failed to act in accordance with their professional code of conduct. Indeed, rather than counterbalancing military
excess, some of these professionals enhanced and enabled such excesses as
part of the so-called war on terror.1
Critics of the professionals‘ conduct often attribute their acts to venality, naked self-interest, and pressure from outside sources,2 while supporters of the conduct may attribute those same acts to a rational decisionmaking process that properly subordinates professional codes to more pressing security needs.3 Both of these explanations, however, rely on an assumption that professionals involved in these situations made a conscious
decision to put expedience ahead of professional conduct, whether for virtuous or venal reasons.4 In a number of cases, however, this assumption
may not bear out.
1
See Jonathan H. Marks, Doctors As Pawns? Law And Medical Ethics At Guantánamo
Bay, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 729 (2007) (acknowledging ―revelations of health professionals‘ complicity in detainee abuse‖); see also HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH‘S
LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 237 (2009) (explaining how the attorneys in the Office of
Legal Counsel within the Department of Justice wrote an opinion about interrogation practices to navigate around legal obstacles which it may not have supported); Peter Margulies,
True Believers at Law: National Security Agendas, the Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separation of Powers, 68 MD. L. REV. 1, 81 (2008) (―Both Yoo‘s memo on permissible interrogation techniques and Goldsmith‘s Article 49 memo failed to identify or analyze the possibility
that interrogation techniques identified as legal would expand into clearly illegal conduct.‖).
2
See, e.g., BRUFF, supra note 1, at 239 (arguing that lawyers gave bad advice on interrogation as a result of ―great pressure to approve practices already in use and to produce intelligence no matter what the cost.‖); Professor Donald Langevoort coined the term ―venality
hypothesis‖ to describe this perspective, see Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers‟ Responsibility for Clients‟ Fraud, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 75, 77–78 (1993) (―To pose the question of attorney motivation is to invite a prompt
answer from many people: greed and moral corruption, of course. Lawyers know of their
clients‘ misdeeds, or at best deliberately close their eyes to the evidence, simply to preserve
their wealth, status and power.‖).
3
See, e.g., JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER‘S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON
TERROR viii–ix. (2006) (arguing that withdrawal of the infamous torture memo ―harmed our
ability to prevent future al Qaeda attacks by forcing our agents in the field to operate in a
vacuum of generalizations‖).
4
See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Legal Advice as Moral Perspective, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 225, 271 (2006) (―Much of this article has proceeded from the presumption that an
attorney is capable of recognizing her own moral perspective as it bears on her professional
decision-making.‖).
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This Article suggests an alternative explanation—one of situationism rather than dispositionism,5 arising from the cognitive incentives faced
by competing professional identities in an organization that rewards organizational deference over independent professional advice. This Article argues
that professionals involved in the war on terror and its excesses may not
have perceived—and may still not perceive—any contradiction between
their actions and their professional code of conduct. Professionals asked to
provide their expertise to the military were playing two roles; in one role,
they were responsible for providing objective legal, medical, or psychological services, and in the other role they were asked to contribute to the success of the military endeavor. Reconciling the two roles is not always easy.
From an outsider‘s perspective, these roles may at times appear to
be in conflict and require the individual to make a choice about which role
to serve at a particular time. This conflict may not be apparent to those on
the inside, however. Instead, an individual may be significantly invested in
the success of both roles, and may have internalized professional identities
related both to military success and professional service. Because these dual
professionals‘ sense of self-identity is linked with success in both spheres,
they may be unconsciously motivated to try to reconcile the two even in
situations where a less invested outsider would see only conflict. Moreover,
these individuals may be cognitively motivated to emphasize the role in
which their efforts obtain immediate positive feedback—or, in other words,
to emphasize their organizational identity over their professional identity.
This Article applies identity theory to help predict when such situations are likely to arise. Awareness of the social and psychological
processes at work can help organizational managers understand how best to
avoid the risks arising from the presence of conflicting professional identities. Similarly, an awareness of the situational factors influencing behavior
can help managers shape the situational setting in ways that encourage activation of the professional identity (thus encouraging independent advice and
counsel) over the organizational identity, which is more likely to be deferential to existing practices.
II. IDENTITY THEORY
Identity theory examines the relationship of the individual to society.6 It asserts that individuals define themselves in part through the groups
they interact with in society, the roles they take on, and the persons they
5
See, e.g., Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How Divergent Views of Human Behavior are Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311 (2008).
6
See PETER J. BURKE & JAN E. STETS, IDENTITY THEORY 6 (2009); Sheldon Stryker &
Peter J. Burke, The Past, Present, and Future of Identity Theory, 63 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 284,
284 n.2 (2000).
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claim to be—for example, a person may be, at the same time, ―a spouse, a
parent, a teacher, a Southerner, a member of the middle class, and a leader.‖7 Although individuals will have different ideas about what it means to
be ―middle class‖ or ―a parent,‖ each of these terms still has certain meanings and expectations that are shared within the larger culture.8 When
people internalize those cultural meanings and expectations, these roles and
group memberships are termed ―identities,‖ and become ―a set of standards
that guide behavior.‖9
Everybody has multiple identities, but not all are actively guiding
behavior at any one time. Identity theory posits that the identities fit together in a hierarchy of ―salience,‖ which is defined as the likelihood of a particular identity‘s activation.10 Thus, ―the higher the salience of an identity
relative to other identities incorporated in to the self, the greater the proba7

Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L. REV.
1, 13 (2009); see, e.g., Matthew O. Hunt, Identities and Inequalities: Exploring Links Between Self and Stratification Processes, in ADVANCES IN IDENTITY THEORY AND RESEARCH
76–77 (2003).
8
Robertson, supra note 7, at 13. Professor David Wilkins has described the formation of
a ―lawyer‖ identity that has both social meanings and internalized meanings:
[T]o be a lawyer in the United States is to become a certain kind of person—one
who sees the world and acts according to normative standards that are distinct from
those that apply to ordinary citizens. Through a complex system of self-selection,
professional education, collegial socialization, and the threat of professional discipline, lawyers are expected to develop and internalize a distinctive professional
identity based on the unique norms and practices of their profession. This ―roledifferentiated morality‖—as both supporters and critics of this standard view of
lawyering refer to it—is a bedrock principle for all professions but particularly for
lawyers.
David B. Wilkins, The New Social Engineers In The Age of Obama: Black Corporate Lawyers and the Making of the First Black President, 53 HOW. L.J. 557, 594 (2010); see also
Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of Professional identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577, 1578 (1993) (―[W]e are reminded at almost every
turn of the extent to which our identities are social constructions. Indeed, our psyches can be
viewed as arenas of contention among competing institutions for primacy in forming a particular conception of the self.‖); Lynn Mather, Presidential Address: Reflections on the
Reach of Law (and Society) Post 9/11: An American Superhero?, 37 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 263,
276–277 (describing the cultural meanings associated with the role of ―lawyer‖ at different
times: ―Law works through its cultural practices and images, as well as through its institutional forms and social processes . . . . The image of Perry Mason has given way to one of an
attorney general filing suit on behalf of an entire state or a wealthy plaintiff lawyer filing a
class action . . . .‖).
9
Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke, Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory, 63 SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY 224, 225 (2000) (―In identity theory, the core of an identity is the
categorization of the self as an occupant of a role and the incorporation, into the self, of the
meanings and expectations associated with that role and its performance.‖); see also BURKE
& STETS, supra note 6, at 32.
10
Id. at 229–30.
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bility of behavioral choices in accord with the expectations attached to that
identity.‖11
Identity formation and salience is influenced by individuals‘ relationships with other people. Identity theory uses the term ―commitment‖ to
describe ―the degree to which persons‘ relationships to others in their networks depend on possessing a particular identity and role,‖ and a higher
commitment to an identity increases its salience.12 Thus, ―a person with
close family, friends, or other significant relationships in a shared religion is
likely to have a more salient religious identity than a person with fewer
ties.‖13 Salience, in turn, predicts behavior—so, a person with a more salient
religious identity is likely to spend more time involved in religious activities.14
Commitment and salience thus reinforce each other. A person with
strongly religious friends and family has a more salient religious identity, as
it is reinforced through commitment to those personal connections. The
salience of the religious identity causes the person to spend more time on
religious activities—where the person then develops even more social and
personal connections with others similarly inclined, thus reinforcing commitment.
These reinforcements are linked through a process termed ―selfverification.‖15 Self-verification helps individuals maintain a stable set of
identities.16 Individuals compare their own self-perceptions, or ―identity
standards,‖ to the evaluations of themselves that are made by others. They
see themselves reflected in the eyes of others, and they compare this reflected self-assessment to their own ideas of who they are. When the reflected
feedback matches their own identity standards, they have obtained ―selfverification‖ and they experience positive emotions.17 When the reflected
feedback does not match their identity standards, negative emotions result.18
These positive and negative emotions are experienced annually
among first-year law students, as law students with a strong ―student identity‖ obtain their first law-school grades.19 Most law students have achieved
strong academic success in the past, and have developed a strong identity
tied to academic success. When some law students obtain lower grades than
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Robertson, supra note 7, at 13 (quoting Stryker & Burke, supra note 6, at 286).
Stryker & Burke, supra note 6, at 286.
Robertson, supra note 7, at 13 (citing Stryker & Burke, supra note 6, at 286).
Id.
Stets & Burke, supra note 9 at 232.
Id.; see also Robertson, supra note 7, at 16.
Stryker & Burke, supra note 6, at 287.
Id.
Robertson, supra note 7, at 17.
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they are used to, their emotional distress results not just from the lower instrumental utility of the grades themselves; instead, it arises from the disconnect between identity and reflected assessment. Thus, when a selfidentified ―A-level student‖ receives a B on an exam, the student may experience anger, depression, and general distress.20
When self-verification fails, individuals will try to bridge the gap
between their situational perception and their identity standard.21 They may
do so by changing the situational assessment, such as by ―modifying study
habits in an effort to improve grades in the future,‖ thus attempting to bring
their external assessment in line with their internal self-perception.22 Alternatively, they may bridge the gap by focusing on different aspects of the
identity to satisfy the assessment; that is, ―seeking and creating new situations in which perceived self-relevant meanings match those of the identity
standard.‖23 Thus, a student disappointed with his or her grades may ―redefin[e] academic success to include being at a certain class rank, rather than
defining success by letter grades alone,‖ or may ―identify . . . a particular
sphere of success, such as moot court or other academic activities.‖24
The reconciliation of identity and reflected assessment can occur
both consciously and unconsciously. Researchers distinguish between strategies that are ―overt/behavioral‖ and those that are ―covert/cognitive.‖25
Overt strategies are those that individuals consciously undertake—for example, an attorney with a strong ―conservative‖ identity may choose to attend Federalist Society meetings, or a doctor with a strong ―service‖ identity
may choose to volunteer with an organization such as Doctors Without Borders. In both cases, the individuals are intentionally associating with larger
groups that reflect and share the individual‘s identity, thus increasing the
opportunities for self-verification.
Covert strategies, however, operate at an unconscious level. In order to avoid the emotional distress that comes from a lack of selfverification, the individual may engage in selective attention (―selfverifying information is given attention and processed, and information that
is not self-confirming is ignored‖) and selective interpretation (―endorsing
feedback that fits self-views and denying feedback that does not fit selfviews‖).26 In cases when ―self-discrepant feedback is unavoidable,‖ re20

Stryker & Burke, supra note 6, at 288.
Robertson, supra note 7, at 17 (citing Stryker & Burke, supra note 6, at 288).
22
Robertson, supra note 7, at 17.
23
Stryker & Burke, supra note 6, at 288.
24
Robertson, supra note 7, at 17 (citing Stryker & Burke, supra note 6, at 288).
25
Jan E. Stets & Alicia D. Cast, Resources and Identity Verification from an Identity
Theory Perspective, 50 SOC. PERSP. 517, 522 (2007).
26
Id. at 522.
21
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searchers have found that ―people may construct the illusion of selfconfirming worlds by ‗seeing‘ more support for their self-views than actually exists.‖27 Thus, ―people with positive self-views will spend more time
scrutinizing favorable feedback than unfavorable feedback, and after undergoing an evaluation they will remember more favorable statements than
unfavorable statements.‖28
III. THE PROBLEM OF DUAL PROFESSIONAL IDENTITIES
Covert/cognitive strategies for self-verification may also provide a
way to resolve conflicting professional identities. Conflicting professional
identities may arise when the same person plays two different roles within
an organization. For example, an attorney who serves as in-house counsel
may have an ―organizational‖ professional identity as an employee of the
corporation as well as an ―advisor‖ identity as an attorney providing neutral
advice to the corporation.29 Likewise, government attorneys may similarly
have a ―policymaker‖ identity in addition to the ―advisor‖ identity.30
While everyone has multiple identities that may be activated in different situations (for example a ―parent‖ identity may be activated at different times than a ―doctor‖ identity), some situations will activate more than
one identity at a time. When this happens, identity theory predicts that ―the
identity with the higher level of prominence or the identity with the higher
level of commitment will guide behavior more than an identity with a lower
level of prominence or commitment.‖31
The same situation arises when an individual possesses two or more
professional identities that are likely to be activated at the same time. A
27

William B. Swann, Jr., The Trouble With Change: Self-Verification and Allegiance to
the Self, 8 PSYCH. SCI. 177, 178 (1997).
28
Robertson, supra note 7, at 18 (citing William B. Swann, Jr., The Trouble with Change:
Self-Verification and Allegiance to the Self, 8 PSYCH. SCI. 177, 178 (1997)).
29
Robertson, supra note 7, at 14; Hugh Gunz & Sally Gunz, Hired Professional to Hired
Gun: An Identity Theory Approach to Understanding the Ethical Behaviour of Professionals
in Non-Professional Organizations, 60 HUM. REL. 851, 854–59 (2007).
30
See Robertson, supra note 7, at 26.
31
PETER J. BURKE & JAN E. STETS, IDENTITY THEORY 133 (2009). The problem of conflict
between two identities is not a new one. When women first entered the legal profession,
some experienced role conflict between their identities as suffragists and as lawyers. See
Renee Newman Knake, The Progress Of Women In The Legal Profession, 29 PACE L. REV.
293, 300–01 (2009) (―[W]hile women lawyers and suffrage activists were ‗closely connected
immediately after the Civil War, they increasingly diverged in the latter decades of the nineteenth century; indeed, it seems that a number of successful women lawyers gradually
adopted a professional identity as lawyers, one that increasingly distanced them from other
women activists,‘ thus establishing a troubling dichotomy for women lawyers that persists
today.‖) (quoting MARY JANE MOSSMAN, THE FIRST WOMEN LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF GENDER, LAW AND THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS 41 (2006)).
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major study of in-house counsel found that the relative salience of the attorney‘s two identities influenced behavior in responding to dilemmas of professional ethics.32 It also suggested that these attorneys were unaware that
identity salience was influencing their choices, thus potentially avoiding the
―identity dissonance‖ that people may experience when there is ―conflict
between irreconcilable aspects of their self-concepts.‖33 In the study, inhouse attorneys were asked to respond to a series of ethical vignettes.34 The
scenarios presented situations in which compliance with the attorney‘s professional obligations would require actions that would be inconsistent with
corporate managers‘ preferred course of action: for example, the attorney
would have to decide whether to report a CEO‘s misconduct to the corporation‘s board of directors.
The relative salience of the conflicting identities affected reported
behavior:35 ―[a]ttorneys who identified more strongly as employees were
statistically more likely to choose the more organizationally deferential options in the vignettes, and those who identified more strongly as ‗lawyers
with a captive client‘ were more likely to choose the more professionally
oriented option.‖36 Thus, the researchers concluded that the salience of lawyer identity in fact shapes ethical behavior.37
In turn, the time spent in each role and the connections developed in
that role similarly influenced the salience of each of the two identities. The
researchers reported a correlation between the amount of time spent on activities, such as business planning, management, and administration, and the
salience of the ―organizational‖ or ―employee‖ identity.38
The study suggested that the effects of identity salience on attorney
behavior happened at an unconscious level. There was no suggestion that
in-house counsel recognized their professional obligations but felt constrained by organizational pressure to avoid them. Indeed, the survey vignettes did not ask not what the attorney would do, but asked instead what
the attorney should do.39 When attorneys answered these questions in ways
that differed from their professional obligations, they were not making a
rational decision to avoid compliance with professional norms; instead, they
were failing to recognize that professional norms called for a different answer than the one they provided.
32

Gunz & Gunz, supra note 29, at 886.
Carrie Yang Costello, Changing Clothes: Gender Inequality and Professional Socialization, 16 NAT‘L WOMEN‘S STUD. ASSN. J. 138, 140 (2004).
34
Robertson, supra note 7, at 14–15 (citing Gunz & Gunz, supra note 29, at 861–63).
35
Gunz & Gunz, supra note 29, at 871.
36
Robertson, supra note 7, at 15 (quoting Gunz & Gunz, supra note 29, at 864, 868–71).
37
Id.
38
Id. (citing Gunz & Gunz, supra note 29, at 868–871).
39
Id. at 15–16 (citing Gunz & Gunz, supra note 29, at 882–86).
33
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The survey results therefore suggest that at least in some cases, the
problem is not merely one of moral courage—instead, it appears that at least
in certain conditions, professionals may truly fail to recognize the ―professionally correct‖ course of action. The individuals in the study were unconsciously ―control[ling] situational meanings to make them more congruent with the meanings held in all of the identity standards.‖40 By unconsciously engaging in selective perception and selection attention, the attorneys in the study were able to avoid contemplation of the disconnect between their chosen course of conduct and their professional responsibilities—and were thus able to avoid the emotional distress that would accompany the failed self-verification of either of their competing professional
identities.
IV. COMPETING PROFESSIONAL IDENTITIES IN ORGANIZATIONAL SETTINGS
Competition between two professional identities leads to a paradox:
an individual hired to provide independent expertise within an organization
becomes increasingly less able to provide that independent expertise as he
or she becomes increasingly more integrated into the organization. As time
is spent on organizational activities and relationships are forged with organizational colleagues, the individual‘s organizational identity gains salience
and becomes more likely to influence behavior and decision-making—
sometimes even to the point that the individual loses sight of professional
obligations that may conflict with organizational goals. In earlier articles, I
have argued that this phenomenon may explain, at least in part, why attorneys involved in the development of the torture memos did not see how
those memos conflicted with legal ethics obligations that appeared clear to
outsiders.41
The phenomenon may also be at work in other situations in which
professionals participate in larger organizations, including—but not limited
to—military operations. As those professionals take on a larger role in the
organization, they may be correspondingly less able to provide independent
expertise. In some cases, the highest-level individuals empowered to act for
the organization may value independent professional judgment, but lower40

BURKE & STETS, supra note 6, at 134.
Robertson, supra note 7, at 22–29; see also Cassandra Burke Robertson, Beyond the
Torture Memos: Perceptual Filters, Cultural Commitments, and Partisan Identity, 42 CASE
W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 389 (2009); see also Peter Margulies, Reforming Lawyers into Irrelevance? Reconciling Crisis and Constraint at the Office of Legal Counsel, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1788349 (March 20, 2011) (―The [Office of Legal Counsel] lawyer
must always consider how other stakeholders, including Congress and the courts, will view
executive initiatives. . . . An OLC lawyer who too readily buys into the President‘s initiatives
will cannibalize her own credibility, and eventually leave the President without the imprimatur that OLC can provide.‖).
41
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level managers in the organization may not value such independence. Individuals within the organization may instead merely desire professional cover, as when military officials ask medical professionals to supervise and
approve questionable interrogation techniques that may rise to the level of
torture.42 In other cases, organizational managers may desire independent
advice, but the organization itself may be structured in such a way that professional independence is neither encouraged nor rewarded. In either case,
the very skills and judgment for which the professional is hired may be subordinated in order to achieve self-verification of the organizational identity—specifically, in the armed forces context, by achieving recognized success in the military endeavor.
Subordinating a conflicting professional identity in military operations may lead to significant problems. These problems are not unique to
military operations led by the United States, but are instead an institutional
problem among military forces worldwide—and are a subset of organizational challenges more generally. Medical professionals in particular have
been involved in a variety of military operations that have led to a significant number of alleged conflicts between professional obligations and operational expediency. Scholars have found instances of such conflicts among
―South African military medical personnel [who] develop[ed] chemical and
biological weapons against opponents of the apartheid regime,‖ ―military
doctors stationed in Namibia during the apartheid era . . . [who] limited care
to local civilian populations in the occupied territory,‖ Russian physicians
―working under the supervision of military officials to help secure the required quota of draftees [who] subordinated their medical judgment by neglecting to register severe illnesses in conscripts they examined, resulting in
numerous fatalities among the soldiers,‖ ―Dutch military doctors in the former Yugoslavia [who] did not provide critical medical care for civilians
under siege in Srebrenica in 1995,‖ and ―American military physicians
[who] were alleged to have failed to maintain adequate medical records to
protect detainees‘ health or ensure their access to medical care at the Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq.‖43
Other professional failures—especially those related the so-called
―War on Terror‖—have been well documented.44 The problem is heightened
when multiple professionals from multiple disciplines fail to check military
42
See Kevin Michael Bond, Physician as Military Officer: Conflicts in Professional Duties
(Aug. 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tennessee), available at
http://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1042&context=utk_graddiss.
43
Leslie London et al., Dual Loyalty among Military Health Professionals: Human Rights
and Ethics in Times of Armed Conflict, 15 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 381, 383
(2006) (citing Steven H. Miles, Abu Ghraib: Its Legacy for Military Medicine, 364 LANCET
725, 728 (2004)).
44
See, e.g., Marks, supra note 1; BRUFF, supra note 1; Margulies, supra note 1.
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excess, as happened in the case of the tortured detainees, where doctors,
psychologists, and lawyers all failed in some respect. Medical doctors
watched interrogations behind glass, offering assessments of whether detainees were ―fit‖ for interrogation; because they believed they were not acting
in the role of a treating physician while offering this advice, they considered
themselves not to be bound by patient-centered medical ethics.45 Psychologists also assisted in interrogation; complaints have been lodged against
some mental-health professionals who are accused of developing the ―enhanced interrogation‖ programs that included sexual humiliation and other
psychological stressors.46
The medical and mental health professionals were not alone in falling short in this area. Government lawyers failed to caution against the illegality of proposed interrogation methods.47 Onlookers noted that some of
the lawyers involved interrogation activities at Guantánamo seemed to have
been ―immersed‖ in operational policy and ―drank the Kool-Aid.‖48 One of
those lawyers, Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver, refused to admit her legal
advice in authorizing waterboarding ran contrary to established law—but
she nonetheless defended her actions by relying on the importance of the
operational mission:
If my legal opinion was wrong, then I regret the error very much. I am a
proud professional. I feel very keenly any failure on my part to be precise
and accurate in the advice I render. I freely accept sincere dissent and criticism. But there is something very important I will never have to regret. At

45
M. Gregg Bloche & Jonathan H. Marks, When Doctors Go to War, 352 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 3 (2006).
46
Morgan Smith, Psychologist in Terror War Is Subject of Complaint, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/us/14ttlawsuit.html.
A complaint against Dr. James E. Mitchell is now before the Texas State Board of
Psychologists, alleging that he violated the profession‘s rules of practice in helping
the C.I.A. develop ‗enhanced interrogation techniques‘ for use in its so-called
black prison sites . . . . Dr. Mitchell . . . parlayed his experience in training American soldiers to survive as prisoners of war into a lucrative consulting business with
the C.I.A. He orchestrated – and, according to the complaint, participated in – the
harsh interrogation of terror suspects using sexual humiliation and the drowning
technique called waterboarding.
47
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 165 (2007) (―How could OLC have written opinions that, when revealed to
the world weeks after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, made it seem as though the administration was giving official sanction to torture . . . . How could its opinions reflect such bad
judgment, be so poorly reasoned, and have such terrible tone?‖).
48
See, e.g., PHILLIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD‘S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF
AMERICAN VALUES 126 (2008) (describing Michael Gelles‘s view of Diane Beaver‘s role in
authorizing waterboarding and other acts at Guantánamo).
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a time of great stress and danger, I tried to do everything in my lawful
power to protect the American people.49

Even military chaplains were subject to competing demands in their
roles as both military officers and religious leaders. At Guantánamo, Muslim chaplains provided religious assistance to detainees.50 Unlike the medical and legal professionals who were too deferential to military expediency,
the chaplains appeared to maintain their independence and comply with
their professional obligations. But they suffered for this independence within the organization; from the beginning, some military members were suspicious of the Muslim chaplains who ―were fervent in their beliefs and encouraged other Muslims to participate in their religious activities,‖ especially as military personnel noticed that ―[a] lot of their religious beliefs mirrored those of the detainees.‖51 As a result, accusations were frequently leveled against the chaplains. Brigidier General Rick Baccus stated that
―[e]very one of the chaplains was accused of something while I was
there.‖52 He noted that the chaplains ―were always under suspicion by the
interrogators, because they were interacting with the detainees and giving
them Korans . . . [The Military Police] just didn‘t like the chaplains going
around talking to the detainees.‖53
The provision of these religious services was criticized by some in
the military who argued that detainees should be expected to freely exercise
their religions on their own—without religious support from military chaplains.54 One military report argued not only that chaplain services were not
needed for the detainees, but that military operations needed to rely more on
chaplaincy services to promote U.S. servicemember morale—and, tellingly,
49
Hearing Before the S. Armed Servs. Comm., 110th Cong. 55 (2008), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_hr/061708beaver.pdf (statement of Diane E. Beaver,
Lieutenant Colonel (ret.), U.S. Army; Former Staff Judge Advocate, Guantánamo Bay).
50
James Yee, the most well-known Muslim chaplain who served at Guantánamo, was at
one point himself arrested on suspicion of aiding terrorist activity. All charges were later
dropped. Dave Mazza, James Yee: An Unlikely Enemy of the State, PORTLAND ALLIANCE,
Jan. 8, 2006.
51
Tim Golden, How Dubious Evidence Spurred Relentless Guantánamo Spy Hunt, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, at 28.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
See ROBERT T. WILLIAMS, THE COMMANDER‘S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DELIVERY OF
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT TO THE DETAINEES IN THE JOA: ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGIOUS NEEDS
BALANCED WITH NECESSARY SECURITY CONCERNS 17 (Naval War College 2006) available at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463665&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.p
df (recommending various policies for chaplain services, and arguing that ―[r]eligious support to detainees is best defined as complete latitude in the exercise of religious duties consistent with the requirements of detention,‖ and that ―[t]he role of the chaplain is to provide
religious support to authorized personnel‖).
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to report instances of low morale among U.S. troops to military commanders.55 These pressures create a classic conflict in professional roles. In the
role of religious leader, the chaplain would provide advice and counsel to
those who seek it. In the role of military officer, however, they would provide advice to military commanders about how best to manage and promote
troop morale.
The fact that the chaplains were able to maintain their professional
commitments in the face of such criticism suggests that they obtained support in their professional role that the other professionals did not. In part,
this may be due to the shared religious identity that was joined with the military-chaplain identity. And, while there is no current allegation that the
chaplains breached their obligations to the military, the number of accusations of such misconduct—including the arrest and subsequent release of
Chaplain James Yee56—suggests that the chaplains did not find it comfortable to balance professional obligations with military responsibility, and that
the organization did not make it easy for them to do so.
Some scholars have criticized viewing such conflicts in terms of
―dual loyalties.‖57 And certainly, when professionals have consciously chosen to set aside professional ethics in favor of organizational expedience,
this view has merit. The military does not require—and should not require—abandonment of professional codes of ethics. The more difficult
situation, however, is when medical, legal, or other professionals do not
consciously set aside their ethical obligations but rather unconsciously avoid
or overlook them. In many of the conflict scenarios outlined above, it is
unlikely that the professionals were consciously aware of the conflict in
their behavior. Instead, it is more likely that they were cognitively motivated to pay attention only to the facts and circumstances related to their
most salient professional identity—here, their organizational/military identity.
While it may seem unlikely that a professional could simply not
―see‖ the conflict with professional values in the situations above, cognitive
motivations are strong forces. All human beings filter information, and must
do so in order to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information—
without such filtering, people would hear ―background noise as loudly as
voice or music‖ and would be unable to enjoy a symphony or to focus on
55
Id. at 16 (―The chaplain‘s active involvement in advising the commander on the performance, morale, and status of the troops might have made the difference [to the events of Abu
Ghraib].‖
56
See supra note 51.
57
See, e.g., George J. Annas, Military Medical Ethics—Physician First, Last, Always, 359
N. ENGLAND J. MED. 1087 (2008) (―[T]hese conflicts are not captured by oversimplified
expressions such as ―mixed agency‖ or ―dual loyalty.‖ . . . The ―physician first‖ guidance is
only half the story; the other half should be ―last and always.‖).
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partners in a conversation.58 At an unconscious level, the human brain therefore devotes more attention to information deemed ―relevant.‖59 A crime
witness, therefore, may recall more about the weapon used than about the
perpetrator‘s physical characteristics—in the heat of the event, the victim‘s
mind has picked the weapon out as the most immediately relevant threat.60
But filtering is not without inherent bias; the same cognitive
processes that define ―relevance‖ will draw on the individual‘s preexisting
beliefs or desires in order to make that calculation.61 As a result, people‘s
attention is drawn to events that mesh with their expectations and beliefs—
and information that counters those beliefs may be unconsciously disregarded. This process was first documented years ago in a study of football.62
Researchers showed a film of a rowdy Princeton/Dartmouth game to students and alumni of both schools, and they asked the viewers to count the
number of rule infractions by each team, to rate those infractions as ―flagrant‖ or ―mild,‖ and to determine which team started the ―rough play.‖63
As might be expected, Princeton supporters perceived different
events than did the Dartmouth supporters. Each group viewed the ―facts‖ of
the game differently, paying selective attention to the facts favorable to their
team. The Princeton group recorded twice as many Dartmouth rule infractions as Princeton ones and judged the Dartmouth rule infractions to be
more often flagrant than Princeton‘s infractions.64 Eighty-six percent of the
Princeton group believed that the Dartmouth team started the rough play.65
By contrast, the Dartmouth group recorded nearly equal numbers of rule
infractions between the two teams and believed that fewer of their team‘s
infractions were ―flagrant.‖66 Nor did they agree that their team had started

58

William H. Starbuck & Frances J. Milliken, Executives‟ Perceptual Filters: What They
Notice and How They Make Sense, in THE EXECUTIVE EFFECT 35, 40 (Donald C. Hambrick
ed., 1988); see also SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 21
(1993) (―Perceptions are, by their very nature, selective.‖).
59
Starbuck & Milliken, supra note 57.
60
Fredrik H. Leinfelt, Descriptive Eyewitness Testimony: The Influence of Emotionality,
Racial Identification, Question Style, and Selective Perception, 29 CRIM. JUST. REV. 317, 322
(2004).
61
Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954); see also Starbuck & Milliken, supra note 58, at 40.
62
Hastorf & Cantril, supra note 60, at 130.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 131–32.
65
Id. at 131.
66
Id.
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the rough play—a majority (fifty-three percent) of the Dartmouth group
stated that ―both teams‖ started the rough play.67
The results suggested that the different perceptions occurred at an
unconscious level—neither group of participants was aware that they were
missing their own team‘s infractions. In fact, one Dartmouth fan, having
heard of his team‘s numerous infractions from a Princeton friend, thought
that he must be missing the part of the film containing these offenses. He
sent a telegram to the researchers: ―Preview of Princeton movies indicates
considerable cutting of important part please wire explanation and possibly
air mail missing part before showing scheduled for January 25 we have
splicing equipment.‖68 Even though they watched the same film, study participants saw two very different games. Researchers concluded from the
study that ―[t]here is no such ‗thing‘ as a ‗game‘ existing ‗out there‘ in its
own right which people merely ‗observe.‘ The game ―‗exists‘ for a person
and is experienced by him only in so far as certain happenings have significances in terms of his purpose.‖69
Military operations are not a football game. But they lend themselves, perhaps even more than a game, to selective perception.70 The fast
pace of action, the stress and fear inherent in the operation, and the importance of the stakes mean that there are many demands for the attention of
participants. Just as the crime victim is likely to best perceive the most immediate threat—the weapon—so too are professionals in the military likely
to focus their attention on the threats perceived to be the most relevant. Under these conditions, it may not be surprising that they do not recognize
conflicts that appear obvious to the outsider evaluating military conduct
from a safe distance of time and space.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL MANAGEMENT
Organizational managers responsible for securing independent professional advice for the larger organization face a significant challenge.
They cannot rely on traditional carrot-and-stick incentives to ensure compliance with professional norms. The threat of professional sanctions or
67

Id. By way of comparison, ―[t]he official statistics of the game, which Princeton won,
showed that Dartmouth was penalized 70 yards, Princeton 25, not counting more than a few
plays in which both sides were penalized.‖ Id. at 129.
68
Id. at 132.
69
Id.
70
Indeed, similar effects of selective perception and selective interpretation have been
replicated in a number of modern studies since the original Princeton/Dartmouth study. See,
e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., „They Saw a Protest‟: Cognitive Illiberalism and the SpeechConduct Distinction, (Cultural Cognition Project Working Paper No. 63), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1755706 (February 5, 2011); Leigh Thompson, “They Saw a Negotiation”: Partisanship and Involvement, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 839 (1995).
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even criminal prosecution cannot influence the behavior of an individual
who simply fails to see that his or her behavior fails to comport with professional obligations. And at least in some cases, it appears that individuals
with dual professional identities may unconsciously subordinate the responsibilities of their independent professional identity in favor of the organizational identity, as the organizational identity is more strongly supported in
the workplace and therefore gains salience over the less-supported professional identity.
This is not to suggest that professional sanctions are inappropriate
in such instances. When professional duties are breached, the profession‘s
licensing body should and must take disciplinary action. Such action is not
merely retributive or coercive, but instead defines the standards of the profession and sets a baseline of expectation for individuals to follow.71 Such
sanctions make a very public statement that certain conduct is inconsistent
with professional duties.72
Nonetheless, sanctions alone are insufficient. The lessons to be
learned from identity theory‘s application to dual professionals in an organizational setting suggest that, by themselves, the threat of such sanctions
cannot ensure compliance with professional standards. By their nature,
sanctions allow only post-hoc identification of misconduct. Organizational
managers, however, must try to ensure compliance ex ante.73 And because
of the cognitive incentives at work, professionals may unconsciously overlook professional responsibilities in favor of adopting positions more deferential to short-term organizational goals.
Recognizing the unconscious situational incentives affecting dual
professionals does not excuse the failure to comply with professional standards. But such recognition can help managers move forward in searching
for strategies to minimize and prevent both the likelihood and the impact of
such failures in the future.74
71

See Mark S. Frankel, Professional Codes: Why, How, And With What Impact?, 8 J. BUS.
ETHICS 109, 110 (1989) (―A profession‘s code of ethics is perhaps its most visible and explicit enunciation of its professional norms. A code embodies the collective conscience of a
profession and is testimony to the groups recognition of its moral dimension.‖).
72
Id. at 111 (―As a visible pronouncement of a profession‘s self-proclaimed role and
values, a code can function as a basis for the public‘s expectations and evaluation of professional performance . . . .‖).
73
See, e.g., Barbara H. Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123, 123
(2003).
74
Scholars looking at other organizational contexts have noted that the organizational
setting can either promote or discourage professional independence. See, e.g., Norman W.
Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism in the Department of Justice, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 409, 446 (2011) (advocating ―reforms that would provide structural support for the
lawyer‘s prohibition when political accountability cannot effectively check an administration‘s extralegal action.,‖ such as transparency, a move away from ―partisanship for those
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Specifically, managers can do two things to reduce the likelihood of
such failures. First, they can structure situational influences in ways that
provide support for—and thereby increase the salience of—individuals‘
professional identity in relation to their organizational identity. Second,
managers can create situational opportunities for individuals to obtain selfverification of their professional identity without sacrificing organizational
status.
As noted above, the more salient an identity is within the hierarchy
of personal identities, the more likely it is that that identity will guide individual behavior. Thus, if the situation can be structured to increase the salience of the individual‘s professional identity, then the individual will be
more likely to perceive—and to pay attention to—professional obligations
that may conflict with short-term organizational goals. And, indeed, there is
evidence of situational influence in this area; research suggests that ―the
identity hierarchy gets slightly re-ordered within a situation as the situation
triggers the salience of some identities over others.‖75 In a simiarlar vein,
other research suggests that an identity can be ―primed‖ through reflection
to achieve increased salience in a given situation, making it more likely that
the identity will be activated.76 For example, writing and describing the
words ―caring,‖ ―compassionate,‖ ―kind‖ and related terms worked to prime
a moral identity.77 Study participants in the primed condition were more
likely to report negative emotions after reading a news story about the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners and were less likely to express moral disengagement.78
Professionals in organizational settings can adopt—and managers
can encourage the organization itself to adopt—strategies that will reinforce
the professional identity.79 Interacting with others in a professional capacity
may have such an effect, as professionals share expectations and discuss the
medical, legal, or other ramifications of a particular issue. Such conversaproviding secret advice,‖ ―strategically decentralized sources of advice for controversial,
covert actions, and prompt professional investigation and sanction (or reduced barriers to
civil liability).‖).
75
Jan E. Stets, Michael J. Carter & Jesse Fletcher, Moral Agency and Emotions: A Control Systems Approach (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) at 32–33.
76
Karl Aquinoa, Americus Reed, Stefan Thauc, and Dan Freeman, A Grotesque and Dark
Beauty: How Moral Identity And Mechanisms Of Moral Disengagement Influence Cognitive
And Emotional Reactions To War, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 385 (2007).
77
Id. at 390.
78
Id.
79
See also Peter Margulies, Lawyers‟ Independence and Collective Illegality in Government and Corporate Misconduct, Terrorism, and Organized Crime, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 939,
941 (2006) (noting that lawyers‘ ―distinctive professional identit[ies]‖—or ―brands‖—can
serve a valid role in the pursuit of their clients‘ goals, but can also conflict with lawyers‘
gatekeeping role, and arguing that lawyers ―must balance branding with gatekeeping‖).
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tions may increase the salience of the professional identity relative to the
organizational identity.
Organizational managers should make sure that professionals have
the opportunity to communicate and network with other professionals—
both in and out of the organizational context. Thus, it would be helpful to
schedule regular meetings for groups of attorneys, doctors, psychologists, or
religious leaders. At these meetings, professionals could discuss questions
and issues as they arise. Given their common background of expertise, professionals in the same area are likely to be able to offer helpful advice regarding thorny issues.
The main benefit of such meetings may not be the professional discussion, however, but may rather be the professional socialization.80 Simply
meeting in a group of others with a shared profession—even in the absence
of ―shop talk‖—may be sufficient to prime the group members‘ professional
identity. In identity theory terms, spending time with others in the profession may increase commitment to that professional identity—thereby raising its salience in the identity hierarchy, and making it more likely that the
professional identity will guide behavior in situations where both the professional identity and the organizational identity may both be activated.
Other strategies would focus not just on re-ordering the situational
salience of professional identity, but would increase opportunities for selfverification of the professional identity. Increasing such verification opportunities would reduce the risk that individuals will fall prey to cognitive
pressure to remain blind to conflicts between professional values and organizational expediency. If the organization appears to reward and value only
actions that meet short-term goals, then individuals will be more likely to
selectively focus on the most immediately compelling organizational
needs—and, like the study participants who watched the football game, or
like the crime victim facing a weapon, they may be blind to the facts and
circumstances outside of this short-term perspective. By contrast, if the organization is structured to reward long-term professional values in addition
to short-term expediency, the individual will be more likely to focus on professional responsibilities as well as organizational aims.
Opportunities for verification of professional identity should be ongoing; it is not enough to integrate the professional into a larger organizational group. If the professional is to maintain a ―professional‖ identity that
is distinct from the ―organizational‖ identity, there must be group members
who can provide opportunities for self-verification of that identity. As one
researcher has noted, ―[w]hen groups were not available to reaffirm old

80

See also M. Gregg Bloche, Caretakers and Collaborators, 10 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 275, 278 (2001) (explaining the need for professional autonomy).
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role-identities, those identities withered and decreased in salience.‖81 By
contrast, when the organization provides opportunities for individuals to
verify multiple identities, both personal well-being and organizational effectiveness are enhanced: the organization is better able to adapt to changing
conditions, and the individual finds support for ―fulfilling the expectations‖
of both identities.82
Creating opportunities for self-verification of the professional identity requires that the organization openly encourage and reward behavior
consistent with professional norms—even when that behavior might not be
in the interest of organizational expediency. Thus, lawyers who advise the
organization that desired actions do not comply with the law, physicians
who insist on proper medical care for prisoners, and chaplains who provide
religious support for detainees should be recognized for their professional
success—not merely tolerated, and certainly not discouraged. Such encouragement need not take the form of financial or material incentive; what is
most needed in this context is simply affirmation. Professionals who do
their jobs—and do them well, even when the requirements of those jobs
may not comport with organizational expediency—should be openly acknowledged.
Moreover, organizational leaders should make it clear that such professional conduct is not at odds with military service. As noted earlier, persons with dual identities are put in a difficult situation if they can verify
only one of two competing identities. However, when the same action is
able to verify both identities together, this harmonization makes it more
likely that that the individual will act in accordance with both identities,
rather than sublimating the less salient identity. Military leaders should
make it clear, then, that good legal advice—even if not organizationally
expedient—is part of being both a good professional and a good military
officer.
Finally, professional organizations themselves can play a role in
enhancing the professional identity of dual-professionals in organizational
settings. Specifically, such organizations should reach out to their military
members, making an effort to include them in the profession more broadly.
This action could have two effects. First, as noted above, it would increase
the individuals‘ connection to their professional community, thus reinforcing the salience of the professional identity. Second, however, it may also
guard against the negative effects that would ensue if military professionals
felt rejected by their larger communities; recent research has suggested that
81

Lynn Smith-Lovin, The Strength of Weak Identities: Social Structural Sources of Self,
Situation and Emotional Experience, 70 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 106, 108 (2007).
82
Amara T. Brook, Julie Garcia, and Monique Fleming, The Effects of Multiple Identities
on Psychological Well-Being, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1588, 1598 (2008).
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professional identity could be diminished if professional organizations are
viewed as rejecting these individuals from inclusion in the group.83
Thus, professional groups should tread extremely carefully in situations that could be seen as marginalizing those with dual identities. When
the American Psychological Association considered a resolution that would
have prohibited psychologists from participating in interrogations entirely,
Colonel Larry James cautioned that this action could discourage military
psychologists, arguing that ―those young psychologists are going to feel as
though we‘ve abandoned them, and they need our support right now.‖84
Similar reactions can also occur when military professionals face sanctions
by outside professional entities.85 While there may be valid reasons to take
such actions, professional licensing bodies should be careful in doing so,
minimizing rhetoric of marginalization or unwelcomeness; the organizations
should clarify that while certain actions may be incompatible with professional duties, military service in and of itself is in no way inconsistent with
professional norms.
VI. CONCLUSION
In recent years, professionals in the military have suffered criticism
for their failure to counter military excess—especially in the area of torture
and maltreatment of detainees. While much of the criticism leveled against
such professionals has assumed that these professionals were making a conscious choice to avoid the strictures of their code of ethics, this Article offers a different view.
This Article applies identity theory to offer a situationist explanation. It argues that some of the professional failures arise from the cognitive
incentives faced by competing professional identities in an organization that
rewards organizational deference over independent professional advice.
Medical, legal, and other professionals in large organizations must deal with
two competing identities—one tied to their profession, and one tied to the
83
See, e.g., Constantina Bedea, et al., Negotiating Dual Identities: The Impact of GroupBased Rejection on Identification and Acculturation, EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. (2011), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ejsp.786/full (finding that for immigrants,
―perceived rejection from the country of origin [can be] more important than the rejection by
the new country into which one has moved‖; rejection from the origin group lessens motivation to maintain the original ethnic identity). This conclusion is ―[i]n line with identity
change research,‖ and therefore may carry over to identity formation and retention generally.
Id. at 9.
84
Military Psychologists Face Complaints with Licensing Boards over Roles at
Guantánamo, DEMOCRACY NOW, http://www.democracynow.org/2010/7/8/military_
pyschologists_face_complaints_with_licensing (July 8, 2010).
85
See id. (noting that professional complaints have been filed against two psychologists
who participated in interrogations).

File: Robertson 2

2011]

Created on: 4/17/2011 7:44:00 PM

Last Printed: 5/22/2011 7:48:00 PM

PROFESSIONAL IDENTITIES

623

organization. Identity theory predicts that when both identities are activated,
individuals are more likely to act in accordance with the more salient identity. For professionals involved in military operations, this has led to a recent
spate of professional failures—professionals gave advice and counsel that
subordinated their professional role to their organizational role, and failed to
check military excess.
The situation can be managed in ways that are likely to increase the
salience of individuals‘ professional identity, making it more likely that the
professional identity will guide behavior. Organizational managers can do
two things to reduce the likelihood of such failures. First, they can structure
situational influences in ways that increase the salience of individuals‘ professional identity in relation to their organizational identity. Second, managers can create situational opportunities for individuals to obtain selfverification of their professional identity without sacrificing organizational
status. Finally, professional organizations themselves can reach out to these
dual professionals, avoiding rhetoric of marginalization or rejection and
affirming their importance to the profession as a whole.

